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Abstract
We analyze retail space-exchange problems where two or more retailers exchange their excess
retail spaces to improve the utilization of their space resource. We rst investigate the two-
retailer space exchange problem. In order to entice both retailers with di¤erent bargaining
powers to exchange their spaces, we use the generalized Nash bargaining scheme to allocate
the total prot surplus between the two retailers. Next, we consider the space-exchange problem
involving three or more retailers, and construct a cooperative game in characteristic function
form. We show that the game is essential and superadditive, and also prove that the core is
non-empty. Moreover, in order to nd a unique allocation scheme that ensures the stability
of the grand coalition, we propose a new approach to compute a weighted Shapley value that
satises the core conditions and also reects retailersbargaining powers. Our analysis indicates
that the space exchange by more retailers can result in a higher system-wide prot surplus and
thus a higher allocation to each retailer under a fair scheme.
Key words: Retail space-exchange, bargaining power, generalized Nash bargaining scheme,
weighted Shapley value.
1 Introduction
A recent innovation in retailing is the establishment of partnerships by exchanging excess
retail space between two (or more) retailers which sell di¤erent products. An example of
this retail space-exchange strategy is the successful partnership between the British retailers
Waitrose (selling food products) and Boots (selling healthcare products). These retailers have
established strategic partnership to stock selective product ranges in each othersstores in
order to utilize their spaces and increase accessibility to consumers; see Stych [37]. Under this
space-exchange strategy, Waitrose can sell its food products in Bootss stores while Waitrose
sells Bootss healthcare products in its stores. Encouraged with the success of their space-
exchange strategy with Boots, Waitrose has also built a partnership with Welcome Break,
which is a British motorway service station operator, opening shops in some stores of the
latter. As another successful example of such a space-exchange strategy, in February 2009
Tim Hortons (a favourite doughnut store in Canada) cooperated with Cold Stone Creamery
(an U.S.-based chain stores of ice cream) to operate their co-brandedstores; refer to Draper
[17]. In July 2009, Bloomberg BusinessWeek [7] released the news that the two rms had
successfully co-branded nearly 50 restaurant locations in the U.S. and Canada within ve
months, and would continue to greatly expand the partnership. The report in [7] shows the
success of the space exchange between Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Creamery.
The success of the space-exchange strategy as implemented by the partnerships formed by
Waitrose and Boots, and Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Creamery naturally depends on, (i)
whether or not the system-wide prot can be improved, and (ii) whether or not each retailer
benets from this strategy. More specically, if the two retailers cannot achieve more prot
jointly, then this strategy would fail because one or both retailers may be unwilling to cooperate.
However, even if the total prot of both retailers increases, then one retailer may still be worse
o¤and thus lose the incentive to cooperate with the other retailer. For this scenario, the retailer
who is better o¤ may have to make a transfer payment to compensate for the other retailers
loss. To examine this issue, it is important to consider the fair allocation of the system-wide
prot surplus generated by the space exchange. We use the generalized Nash bargaining scheme
to analyze the problem.
Since more than two retailers can also cooperate to exchange excess retail spaces, (e.g.,
Waitrose, Boots and Welcome Break), one should investigate the space exchange problem
with three or more retailers. For this problem, it is also important to examine whether or
not the system-wide prot can be increased, and thus it is necessary to consider the problem
of fair allocation among three or more retailers. For this multiple-retailer problem, we use
the weighted Shapley value to determine the fair allocation. We develop a new approach to
compute the weighted Shapley value that must be in the core and thus assure the stability of
the grand coalition.
The space-exchange strategy results in indirect sales known as the cross-category e¤ect
for both retailers which should be taken into account when analyzing the retail space-related
problems described above. In one of the earliest works to investigate the cross-category e¤ect,
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Corstjens and Doyle [13] use a space-dependent demand function which can be used to estimate
the demand for each retailer. When cross-category e¤ect is not considered, a simpler type of
direct sales demand function is obtained. We present a generalized demand model which
includes the Corstjens and Doyles model and the direct sales model as special cases. Our
more general model is used to estimate each retailers sales at his own space and sales at other
retailersspaces.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we review representative
relevant publications, and summarize our papers major contributions to the literature. In
Sections 3 and 4 we investigate the space-exchange problem with two retailers, and that with
three or more retailers, respectively. In Section 5 we conclude with a summary of major
managerial insights that we draw from our analysis.
2 Literature Review
In this section, we briey review the space-related publications, which are classied into two
categories: (i) the space allocation decision for a single retailer, and (ii) the space allocation
decisions in the multi-rm settings. Since our paper is concerned with a space decision problem,
we only consider representative publications with a focus on the space decision. This also
distinguishes our review from a number of review sections in other papers, which present the
surveys on various space-related problems without emphasizing the space decisions. Our review
is then used to show the originality and importance of our paper.
2.1 The Space Allocation Decision for a Single Retailer
In a seminal paper which is relevant to our discussion, Lee [26] considered a retailers optimal
space allocation decision that maximizes the retailers prot, assuming that the unit sales for
a product are increasing in the shelf space allocated to the product at a decreasing rate. For
a review of other early papers published before the middle of the 1970s, see Curhan [14] who
shows that the cross-category (or, cross-elasticity) e¤ect i.e., the impact of sales in a category
on the sales in another category in the retail store was not considered in early publications.
Corstjens and Doyle [13] constructed a multiplicative demand model that involves the cross-
category e¤ect between two or among three or more products. Using their demand model, the
authors developed a prot function for a retailer, who maximizes his prot to nd optimal
space allocation decisions. Corstjens and Doyle [13] used a case to estimate the parameters in
the retailers prot function, solved it to nd optimal results, and discussed the multiplicative
demand model. The demand model in [13] has been widely applied to investigate a variety
of space allocation problems. Bookbinder and Zarour [8] extended the Corstjens and Doyles
model [13] by incorporating the concept of direct product prot (DPP), which is calculated as a
retailers gross margin plus total allowance minus total direct product costs. They constructed
a constrained maximization problem, estimated parameter values for the problem with two
products, and solved the resulting numerical problem to nd optimal space allocation decisions.
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Borin, Farris, and Freeland [9] also investigated a space allocation problem with the cross-
category e¤ect, but constructed a demand model that di¤ers from the Corstjens and Doyles
model [13]. Specically, the demand model in [9] consists of two components in a multiplicative
form, which include (i) each stock-keeping units (SKU) proportion of the available demand
for non-stocked SKUs, which is described by an attraction model, and (ii) the total demand
for non-stocked SKUs. Borin, Farris, and Freeland [9] developed a constrained maximization
problem to determine the product selection and nd the optimal spaces allocated to those
selected products. Irion et al. [24] incorporated the product-specic facings (allocated to each
product) into the Corstjens and Doyles model [13]. The authors used a piecewise linearization
technique to reformulate their complicated nonlinear space-allocation model into a linear mixed
integer programming problem, which can be solved to obtain near-optimal solutions for large
scale optimization problems.
The above publications were only concerned with the space allocation decision for a retailer.
We now review representative publications where a retailer makes joint decisions on space
allocation and other attributes such as assortment and inventory. As an early publication,
Anderson and Amato [1] considered a retailers joint decisions on the brand selection and the
space allocation to each selected brand. A prot function for the retailer was constructed
to involve the demand of switching-preference buyers who are allowed to switch from their
preferred brands to others. Anderson and Amato [1] derived a necessary condition for the
optimal solutions, developed an algorithm to search for the optimal solutions, and discussed
the implications of their model. In [20] Hansen and Heinsbroek proposed an algorithm to nd
a retailers joint optimal decisions on the product assortment and the space allocation among a
given set of products. Di¤erent from the model in [1], Hansen and Heinsbroeks model involves
the space elasticity of the sales and two constraints on the shelf space allocated to each product.
Baron, Berman, and Perry [5] analyzed the joint shelf space allocation and inventory de-
cisions for a retailer who sells multiple items to satisfy the space- and inventory-dependent
demand in the multiplicative function form as in [13]. The authors used the level-crossing the-
ory to analyze their problem, and considered numerical examples with two products to examine
the impact of space and inventory on the demand. In [21], assuming a multiplicative demand
function for each product on a shelf as in [13], Hariga, Al-Ahmari, and Mohamed built a prot
function model for a retailer who simultaneously determines the product assortment, inventory
replenishment, display area and shelf space allocation decisions. The authors used the LINGO
software to solve the complex mixed integer nonlinear problem.
2.2 The Space Allocation Decisions in the Multi-Firm Settings
In recent years, a few publications have appeared to address the space allocation problems
involving multiple rms rather than a single retailer. Kurtulus¸ and Toktay [25] investigate a
space allocation problem for a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and two com-
peting manufacturers whose products are of di¤erent brands but belong to a single category.
Each manufacturer makes its wholesale pricing decision, and the retailer determines the shelf
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space allocated to the category. Assuming a linear, retail price-dependent demand function
and a convex space cost for the retailer, the authors obtained the retail prices for two prod-
ucts by using two category management mechanisms i.e., (i) retailer category management
(RCM) where the retailer make the pricing decisions and (ii) category captainship (CC) where
a manufacturer acts as the decision maker. Kurtulus¸ and Toktay [25] showed that the category
shelf space under CC may be higher than under RCM, and the shelf space allocated to the
category is increasing in the retailers share of the supply chain-wide prot.
Martínez-de-Albéniz and Roels [15] investigated a retail-space allocation problem for a
two-level supply chain where a retailer decides to allocate its shelf space to multiple competing
suppliersproducts belonging to the same category. The demand for each product was charac-
terized by using the Corstjens and Doyles model [13]. The multiple suppliers rst make their
wholesale pricing/attraction (the retailers maximum prot from each product) decisions in
Nash equilibrium, and the retailer then makes its optimal space allocation decision. Martínez-
de-Albéniz and Roels [15] analyzed their problem with both endogenous and exogenous retail
prices, and examined the loss of e¢ ciency resulting from shelf space competition among the
suppliers by using numerical examples with two products.
Leng, Parlar, and Zhang [27] investigated the pricing and space allocation decisions for
two (non-cooperating) retailers whose stores are located at two end points of a linear city.
They used the Hotelling model to analyze consumerschoices for their shopping stores and to
estimate the demand functions for two retailers, derived the two retailersoptimal prices given
the space allocation in each store, and then obtained the two retailers Nash equilibrium space
allocation decisions. Leng, Parlar, and Zhang [27] showed that the two retailers should adopt
the space-exchange strategy, if their stores are large enough to serve at least one-half of their
consumers. In addition, the authors found that the space exchange induces the two retailers
to increase their prices.
2.3 General Remarks
Our review shows that majority of extant publications have used or extended the Corstjens
and Doyles demand model [13] to analyze the space allocation problem. Moreover, most
of the relevant publications are concerned with a single retailers space decision. Among a
few recent publications that address space allocation problems with two or more rms, only
one publication (i.e., [27]) investigated the competition between two retailers, whereas other
publications considered two-echelon supply chains involving multiple suppliers/manufacturers
and a retailer. Our papers major contributions to the literature are summarized as follows:
1. We generalize the Corstjens and Doyles model [13] to estimate the demand for each prod-
uct category in space exchange problems. Our generalized model includes the Corstjens
and Doyles model and the direct sales model as special cases.
2. Our paper addresses the space exchange problem between two retailers, which is a new
research topic in the marketing and operations management areas. We draw a number of
managerial insights that are di¤erent from Leng, Parlar, and Zhang [27] who used non-
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cooperative game theory to analyze the space exchange-related problem. Our managerial
insights are expected to help practitioners benet from the space-exchange strategy. For
a summary of our six major insights, see Section 5.
3. Our paper signicantly di¤ers from [27] because of the following four facts. First, we
use the space-dependent demand functions in a multiplicative form (as in Corstjens and
Doyle [13]), whereas Leng, Parlar, and Zhang [27] applied the Hotelling model to derive
the price-dependent demand functions. Secondly, we focus on the fair allocation of prot
surplus resulting from the space exchange, which assures the retailersincentives to co-
operate for such a strategy. This was ignored in [27], where the authors assumed that
two retailers are willing to cooperate. Thirdly, in our paper, both the space exchange
problem with two retailers and that with three or more retailers are analyzed, whereas
in [27] only the two-retailer problem was investigated. Fourthly, we examine a more re-
alistic case in which the retailers under the space exchange strategy may have di¤erent
bargaining powers, whereas Leng, Parlar, and Zhang [27] assumed that two retailers have
equal bargaining powers.
We also note that, to investigate the space-exchange problems, we use cooperative game
theory but Leng, Parlar, and Zhang [27] apply non-cooperative game theory. This is so
mainly because our paper is focused on retailersincentives for exchanging their spaces,
whereas Leng, Parlar, and Zhang [27] emphasize the impact of space exchange on retailers
pricing decisions under the assumption that the retailers are willing to cooperate.
4. We provided a new approach for the computation of weighted Shapley value, which is an
important concept in cooperative game theory. Our approach should be of help to other
researchers who consider the allocation of prot surplus or cost savings among multiple
players with di¤erent bargaining powers.
3 The Space-Exchange Problems with Two Retailers
In this section we consider a two-player space-exchange problem where two retailers exchange
their retail spaces to increase sales. As indicated by the practice of Waitrose and Boots and
also by that of Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Creamery, the retail space-exchange strategy
applies only when the cooperating retailers products belong to unsubstitutable categories,
e.g., Waitroses food vs. Bootss healthcare products; and, Tim Hortonss doughnuts vs. Cold
Stone Creamerys ice cream. Thus, we can reasonably assume that the products in categories
i = 1; 2 sold by retailer i = 1; 2, are not substitutable.
The total retail space that is owned by retailer i is denoted by Si > 0 for i = 1; 2. To
implement the space-exchange strategy, retailer i who sells the products in category i decides
to allocate the retail space Sij 2 [0; Si] (j = 1; 2, j 6= i) to retailer j who can then sell the
products of category j using the space Sij at the site of retailer i. As a result of the space
exchange, retailer i sells the products of category i in the remaining space Sii  Si Sij at his
own store as the host retailer,and also in the new retail space Sji at retailer j as the guest
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retailer.Even though a retailer sells his products at both stores, the realized sales in the host
and guestspaces could be di¤erent because of the following factors: (i) Consumers who intend
to buy the products in category i would more likely visit the store owned by retailer i, since
the store brand certainly impacts their purchasing decisions, and (ii) the hostand guest
stores are located at di¤erent neighborhoods where consumers may have di¤erent purchasing
powers and behaviors. In this paper, we use the term store e¤ect to describe the impacts of the
above two factors, and develop di¤erent functions to model the realized sales of each retailer
at his hostand guestretail spaces.
Next, we rst analyze a retail space-exchange game where two retailers determine their
hostretail spaces with no communication. We solve the simultaneous-movegame to nd
two retailersdecisions in Nash equilibrium, and then compute the retailers excess retail space
as the total owned space Si (i = 1; 2) minus the equilibrium host space. The excess space is
what the retailer occupies but does not need to improve his protability, and both retailers
exchange their excess spaces to e¤ectively use up the resource.
We begin our analysis by developing the prot functions of the two retailers.
3.1 Prot Functions of Two Retailers
After the retailers exchange their excess spaces, retailer i = 1; 2 realizes sales generated at
both host and guest spaces. Let Dii(Si   Sij) denote retailer is realized sales at his host
space Si   Sij after retailer i allocates the space Sij to retailer j (j = 1; 2, j 6= i); and let
Dij(Sji) denote retailer is realized sales at his guest space Sji that is allocated by retailer j.
Since Sii  Si   Sij, we can simply write retailer is sales at the site of retailer j as Dij(Sji),
for i; j = 1; 2. To simplify our analysis and obtain useful managerial insights, we dene each
retailers realized sales at either the host or guest space as the minimum of, (i) that retailers
available stock, and, (ii) the customerstotal demand during one year. If we do not use the
above denition, then we have to consider each retailers stocking decision to determine his
realized sales. Note that we will use a multiplicative demand model, apply non-cooperative
game theory to nd space allocation decisions, and use cooperative game theory to allocate
the prot surplus between two or among three or more retailers. Thus, if, for space-exchange
problems, each retailer makes joint stocking and space allocation decisions, then our models
will be intractably complicated and we cannot nd any insightful result. Therefore, we adopt
the above denition to simplify our analysis, similar to, e.g., Wang and Gerchak [40] who
analyzed a space-related problem assuming that there is always su¢ cient inventory to satisfy
deterministic demand.
For our space-exchange problem, retailer is realized sales consist of direct and indirect sale
components. The direct realized sales of retailer i are the sales generated as a result of his e¤ort
and independent of the space exchange decisions. This means that even if the two retailers do
not exchange their excess spaces, they can realize the same direct sales as those in the space-
exchange case (if total operating space of each retailer is the same). In addition to the realized
direct sales, we also consider the indirect sales that are generated by exchanging retail space.
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Note that the space-exchange strategy results in two categories of products available for sale at
the stores of both retailers. A consumer who intends to buy a category 1 product (called lead
category) may also purchase a category 2 product, and vice versa. (For details regarding the
lead category concept, see, e.g., Chen et al. [12] who used the term potential salesrather than
indirect sales.) Since exchanging retail spaces may entice the consumers with lead category
i (i = 1; 2) to buy products in category j (j = 1; 2, and j 6= i), the space-exchange strategy
results in indirect sales for both retailers. Such an impact of the space exchange is called the
cross-category e¤ect.
The cross-category e¤ect in retail space-related problems has been investigated by a number
of researchers in the marketing and operations management elds; see, e.g., Chen et al. [12],
Corstjens and Doyle [13], Hruschka et al. [23], Lim et al. [28], Niraj et al. [32]. A few extant
publications [e.g., Chen et al. [12]] developed some linear functions to calculate the indirect
sales. To estimate the cross-category e¤ect in a nonlinear way, most relevant publications [e.g.,
Lim et al. [28]] adopted the Corstjens and Doyles space-dependent sales (demand) model in
a polynomial form [13]. For such space-related problems, the Corstjens and Doyles model is
commonly used to calculate retailer is sales in the space Sji at the site of retailer j as,
Dij(Sji) = ijS
ji
ji (Sj   Sji)
j
i` , for i; j; ` = 1; 2, ` 6= i. (1)
In this model, ij > 0 denotes the scale parameter; Sji and Sj   Sji are two retailersshelf
spaces at the site of retailer j (as dened previously); 0 < ji < 1 represents the direct space
elasticity that a¤ects the direct sales of retailer i at the site of retailer j; and 0 < ji` < 1 is the
cross space elasticity between categories i and ` (because i; ` = 1; 2 and i 6= `), which impacts
the indirect sales of retailer i at the site of retailer j.
The Corstjens and Doyles model (1) has been widely used to analyze space-related prob-
lems. But, we cannot apply it to calculate two retailerssales in our space-exchange problem,
because of the following reasons:
1. When retailer i occupies the total available space Sj at the site of retailer j, i.e., Sji = Sj,
the Corstjens and Doyles model in (1) implies that retailer is sales is zero. This is not
realistic because retailer i utilizes Sj to operate and thus realizes a non-zero direct sales.
In fact, if the cross-category e¤ect is not considered, then retailer is (direct) sales function
should be simply written as
Dij(Sj) = ijS
ji
j , (2)
which is a broadly-used space- or inventory-dependent demand function; see, e.g., Baker
and Urban [3], Bar-Lev et al. [4], Brueckner [10], Wang and Gerchak [40]. For a detailed
discussion regarding the advantages of the model in (2), see Baker and Urban [3]. One
may note that, when Sji = Sj, the Corstjens and Doyles model (1) cannot be reduced
to the direct sales function in (2).
2. Consider the case where retailer i does not use the total available space Sj, i.e., Sji < Sj.
In this case, if Sj   Sji < 1, then, because ji` > 0, retailer is sales Dij(Sji) is smaller
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than ijS
ji
ji , which represents the direct sales achieved by retailer is own e¤ort. That is,
using the Corstjens and Doyles model in (1), we nd that, if Sj Sji < 1, then retailer is
sales may be reduced as a consequence of the cross-category e¤ect. Such a result (for the
case that Sj   Sji < 1) is inconsistent with other relevant publications [e.g., Chen et al.
[12], Lim et al. [28], Niraj et al. [32]], in which researchers found that the cross-category
e¤ect should have a positive impact on the performance of retailers whose products are
not substitutable.
Taking the above into account, we generalize the Corstjens and Doyles model to describe
the sales that retailer i (i = 1; 2) realizes in the space Sji at the site of retailer j (j = 1; 2).
Our model is given as,
Dij(Sji) = S
ji
ji [ij + ^ij(Sj   Sji)
j
i` ], for i; j; ` = 1; 2, ` 6= i, (3)
where ij; ^ij  0 can be regarded as the scale parameters for the direct and indirect sales,
respectively. It is easy to see that when ij = 0, our generalized model and the Corstjens and
Doyles model in (1) have the same structure; and when ^ij = 0, our model can be reduced
to the commonly-used direct sales model in (2). Actually, the model in (3) is suitable to
the analysis of space-exchange problems because of the following reason: Under the space-
exchange strategy, two or more retailers exchange their excess spaces each other. As a result,
there are two or more product categories for sale at the store of each retailer in the space
exchange alliance. Recall from our literature review in Section 2.1 that Corstjens and Doyle
[13] developed the model in (1) to characterize the demands for n  2 products. The Corstjens
and Doyles model has been used to investigate various space-related problems in a number of
publications, among which some publications (e.g., [5], [8], [15], etc.) applied the Corstjens and
Doyles model to determine the space allocation between two products. Therefore, the above
shows that the Corstjens and Doyles model in (1) is proper to the space allocation problems
with two or more products, and our generalized model in (3) are thus suitable to the space
exchange problems in which each retailer decides to allocate the space at his own store between
his product category and the other retailers product category or among his category and the
categories of other two or more retailers.
We let mi > 0 denote retailer is prot margin measured by the sales prot per unit
space, e.g., dollars per square foot. Some marketing researchers [e.g., Anderson et al. [2] and
Blattberg and Neslin [6]] have shown that the prot margins of di¤erent products in the same
category are typically identical and setting a uniform margin has been a common pricing rule
for retailers. In our paper, the products that each retailer sells belong to a single category;
thus, it is reasonable to assume that each retailer applies an identical prot margin to his
products. This assumption has been used in marketing- and operations management-related
publications; see, for example, Cachon and Kok [11], Dong et al. [16]. The operating cost
at retailer is store is hi dollars per unit retail space per year. Thus, if two retailers do not
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exchange their excess spaces, their prot functions are simply
i(Si) = miDii(Si)  hiSi, for i = 1; 2. (4)
Now consider the two retailerssales prots after they exchange their retail spaces Sij 2
[0; Si], for i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j. Retailer i incurs the operating cost of hi(Sii) in his host space, and
hj(Sj   Sjj) in his guest space. We write the two retailerspost-exchange net prot functions
as
i(Sii;Sjj) = mi[Dii(Sii) +Dij(Sj   Sjj)]  hiSii   hj(Sj   Sjj), for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j, (5)
where Dii(Sii) and Dij(Sj  Sjj) are retailer is realized sales in his host space Sii and those in
the guest space Sj   Sjj (that retailer j gives to retailer i), respectively.
3.2 The Space-Exchange Analysis with Two Retailers
We now consider the space-exchange problem with two retailers who determine their spaces
that maximize their prots in a simultaneous-move setting, and exchange their excess spaces.
We then use cooperative game theory to allocate the prot surplus between the retailers.
3.2.1 Computation of Excess Spaces
We solve a space-exchange game where two retailersprots are given as in (5). Note that,
to willingly implement the space-exchange strategy, two retailers should benet from space
exchange by achieving a higher prot (or, a positive prot surplus). We next calculate the
prot surpluses that two retailers obtain per year after exchanging their excess spaces. Let
i denote retailer is prot surplus generated by the space exchange. We use equations (4)
and (5) to nd the prot surpluses as i (i = 1; 2),
i = i(Sii;Sjj) i(Si) = mi[Dii(Sii) Dii(Si)+Dij(Sj Sjj)]+hi(Si Sii) hj(Sj Sjj), (6)
for j = 1; 2 and j 6= i.
If 1 + 2 < 0, then the two retailers cannot concurrently benet from the space
exchange, and they should not be willing to exchange their excess spaces. When1+2  0,
one of the two retailers may still experience a prot loss, i.e., either1 or2 may be negative.
For this case, the retailer with a positive prot surplus can allocate a part of his surplus to the
other retailer, in order to assure that both retailers are better o¤ from space exchange. Hence,
we can conclude that the condition for the successful space exchange is 1 + 2  0.
Using the above we nd that, to make a space allocation decision, each retailer should
consider the constraint that 1 + 2  0. That is, in the simultaneous-move game, retailer
is (i = 1; 2) constrained maximization problem is written as follows:
maxi(Sii;Sjj), s.t., 1 + 2  0 and 0  Sii  Si. (7)
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Retailer i determines his Nash equilibrium-characterized host space SNii , and compute excess
spaces (that are then allocated to the other) as this retailers total own space Si minus the host
space SNii .
Theorem 1 The host space SNii (i = 1; 2) in Nash equilibrium is obtained as
SNii = min(max(S^ii; zi); Si) =
8><>:
zi, if S^ii  zi,
S^ii, if zi < S^ii  Si,
Si, if S^ii  Si,
(8)
where zi  fSii : Dii(Sii) = Dii(Si) and Sii 6= Sig is a unique value in the range (0; Si); and S^ii
uniquely satises
ii
i
iS
ii 1
ii + ^iiS
ii 1
ii (Si   Sii)
i
i` 1[ii(Si   Sii)  ^iiii`Sii] = hi=mi. (9)
Proof. For a proof of this theorem and the proofs for all subsequent theorems, see online
Appendix A.
It follows from Theorem 1 that the optimal excess space that retailer i (i = 1; 2) allocates
to retailer j (j = 1; 2, j 6= i) is calculated as,
SNij = Si   SNii = [Si  max(S^ii; zi)]+, for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j, (10)
where x+ = max(0; x) for any x, and S^ii is dependent on the ratio of unit operating cost hi
to prot margin mi. From (9), we nd that the retailer with a higher value of hi=mi should
secure less host space and allocate more to the other retailer.
3.2.2 Allocation of System-Wide Prot Surplus
When two retailers exchange their optimal excess spaces as given in (10), they will jointly
benet from space exchange by achieving the total prot surplus 1+ 2  0. As discussed
in Section 3.2.1, even when 1 + 2  0, one of the two retailers may still experience a
prot loss, i.e., either 1 or 2 may be negative. For example, if the unit operating cost
h2 at retailer 2s store is su¢ ciently high, then retailer 1s prot surplus 1 could become
negative but retailer 2s prot surplus 2 could be positive; similarly, if h1 is very high, then
retailer 2 may have negative prot surplus but retailer 1 may achieve positive surplus.
Thus, when 1 + 2  0, we need to consider the following three possible cases:
Case 1: 1  0 and 2  0. In this case, neither retailer is worse o¤after the excess space
exchange; but they may bargain on allocating the system-wide prot surplus, because of
the following reason: When a retailers prot surplus is very small (e.g., retailer 1s prot
surplus 1 = 0) and the other retailers prot surplus is large (e.g., retailer 2s prot
surplus 2 > 0), we nd that if the latter retailer does not share a part of his large
surplus to the former retailer, then the former may have no incentive to cooperate with
the latter. It behooves us to consider the question of how to fairly allocate the prot
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surplus between two retailers so as to induce coalition stability. Under a fair allocation
scheme, both retailers would be willing to exchange their excess space and they would
be both better o¤ than leaving the two-player coalition. Moreover, the fair allocation of
total prot surplus between these two retailers should depend on their relative bargaining
powers. Later we will use the concept of generalized Nash bargaining scheme to analyze
such an allocation problem.
Case 2: 1 > 0 and 2 < 0. In this case, retailer 1 benets from the space exchange and
gains a positive prot surplus; but, retailer 2 is worse o¤ than without space exchange. In
order to attract retailer 2 to cooperate and make the two-player coalition stable, retailer
1 would be willing to share his prot surplus 1 with retailer 2. Similar to Case 1, we
also need to consider the fair allocation between these two retailers for this case.
Case 3: 1 < 0 and 2 > 0. This case is similar to Case 2, but retailer 1 is worse o¤
whereas retailer 2 achieves a positive surplus 2.
As we discussed above, when two retailers make their decisions as given in Theorem 1,
we should analyze the problem of fairly allocating the system-wide prot surplus 1 + 2
between retailers 1 and 2. We start with the following discussion on the fairness criteria for
the allocation of the total prot surplus. We learn from Theorem 1 that two retailers are not
worse o¤ than without exchanging their excess spaces; this means that the space exchange
decisions in Nash equilibrium are acceptableto both retailers. However, a retailer who only
acceptsan allocation method may still feel that he is treated unfairly and thus leave the two-
player coalition, if that retailers secured allocation cannot reect his bargaining power for the
allocation. Therefore, as discussed in many allocation-related publications (e.g., Hamlen et al.
[19]), a fair allocation scheme must be acceptable to both retailers and also be compatible with
the retailersrelative bargaining powers. We present below a denition to explicitly explain
the allocation fairness used in our paper.
Denition 1 A scheme of allocating total prot surplus between or among all retailers in a
coalition is fair, if and only if the allocation scheme reects these retailersrelative bargaining
powers. 
In our retail space-exchange problem, retailers 1 and 2 fully divide the surplus 1 + 2
in such a manner that each retailer gains a portion of 1 + 2 that reects the retailers
bargaining power. To facilitate our analysis, we use the notation yi to denote the surplus
allocated to retailer i, for i = 1; 2; that is, we consider how to fairly determine the values of y1
and y2 such that y1 + y2 = 1 + 2  0. For our space-exchange problem, we assume that,
to allocate total prot surplus 1 + 2, retailer 1s and retailer 2s bargaining powers are
denoted by 1 and 2, respectively.
To fairly allocate the surplus 1 + 2 between these two retailers, we use generalized
Nash bargaining (GNB) scheme (see Nash [31] and Roth [33]), which is a unique solution
satisfying the following maximization problem:
maxy10;y20 y
1
1 y
2
2 , s.t. (y1; y2) 2 P, (11)
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where yi and y0i correspond to retailer is allocated surplus, and security level, respectively,
i = 1, 2; and P denotes the set of Pareto optimal solutions. Note that, in our problem,
(y01; y
0
2) = (0; 0). Moreover, because two retailers fully share the system-wide prot surplus
1 + 2, the set of Pareto optimal solutions is P = f(y1; y2) : y1 + y2 = 1 + 2g.
The concept of GNB scheme has been used to analyze supply chain-related problems, see, e.g.,
Nagarajan and Bassok [30].
Theorem 2 When two retailers keep their host spaces as obtained in Theorem 1 and exchange
their excess spaces in (10), the GNB scheme suggests that, in order to entice both retailers to
join the two-player coalition, they should share the system-wide prot surplus 1 + 2 as
follows:
yi = (1 + 2)
i
1 + 2
, for i = 1; 2.  (12)
As Theorem 2 indicates, the allocation suggested by the GNB scheme depends on two
retailersrelative bargaining powers, i.e., i=(1 + 2), for i = 1; 2. Note that retailers 1 and 2
respectively realize their own prot surpluses 1 and 2 before the allocation of 1+2,
and obtain the GNB allocations y1 and y

2 that are given in Theorem 2. Since i may not be
equal to yi , for i = 1; 2, we need to calculate the side-payment transferred between these two
retailers under the GNB allocation scheme.
Since retailer i = 1; 2 realizes the prot surplus i and obtains the GNB allocation yi , we
can compute the non-negative side-payment ij that this retailer transfers to retailer j (j = 1; 2,
j 6= i) as follows:
ij = (i   yi )+ =

j i   i j
i + j
+
. (13)
Because 1+2 = y1 +y

2, one of 12 and 21 must be zero. If 12 = 21 = 0, then 1 = y

1
and 2 = y2, and there is no side-payment between two retailers; if 12 > 0 and 21 = 0,
then retailer 1 transfers the side-payment 12 to retailer 2; otherwise, retailer 2 transfers the
side-payment 21 to retailer 1.
It is useful to note from (13) that, when 1 > 0 and 2 > 0, which each retailer makes
the payment transfer depends on the comparison between the ratios 1=2 and 1=2. The
ratio 1=2 represents the relative prot surpluses of two retailers at their own sites; and
the ratio 1=2 is two retailersrelative bargaining powers. For instance, if, compared with
retailer 2, retailer 1s bargaining power is strong but his own prot surplus is small, then
retailer 1 should gain more to have an incentive to stay in the two-retailer coalition for the
space exchange; thus, for this case, retailer 2 should transfer a side-payment to retailer 1.
3.2.3 A Numerical Example for the Space Exchange Analysis with Two Retailers
We use the parameter values given in Table 1 for our computation.
For the space exchange problem with two retailers, we rst use Theorem 1 to compute the
Nash equilibrium-based host spaces for two retailers. We nd that S^11 = 67:23 < z1 = 82:68
12
m1 m2 h1 h2 S1 S2 1 2 
1
12 
2
12
15 25 4 6 100 60 3 8 0:1 0:2
11 ^11 12 ^12 21 ^21 22 ^22 
1
1 
2
1 
1
2 
2
2
4 0:3 1 0:2 3 0:3 6 0:4 0:5 0:4 0:3 0:4
Table 1: The parameter values in the numerical example for the space exchange analysis with
two retailers. Note that prot margins mi (i = 1; 2), operating costs hi (i = 1; 2) and two
retailerstotal available host spaces Si (i = 1; 2) are measured in $=unit, $=sq. ftand sq.
ft., respectively.
and z2 = 45:89 < S^22 = 48:07 < S2; thus, according to (8), Retailer 1s and retailer 2s host
spaces in Nash equilibrium are obtained as SN11 = z1 = 82:68 sq. ft. and S
N
22 = S^22 = 48:07 sq.
ft. and the excess spaces that the two retailers exchange are thus calculated as SN12 = S1 SN11 =
17:32 sq. ft. which is allocated by retailer 1 to retailer 2 and SN21 = S2   SN22 = 11:93 sq.
ft. which is allocated by retailer 2 to retailer 1.
After two retailers exchange their excess spaces, we use (6) to nd the prot surpluses of
retailers 1 and 2 as 1 = $55:67 and 2 = $218:01, which means that retailer 2 gains much
more from the space-exchange than retailer 1. In order to entice retailer 1 to exchange his excess
space, we should fairly allocate the system-wide prot surplus 1 + 2 = $273:68 between
the two retailers. We follow Theorem 2 to calculate the GNB allocation as y1 = $74:64 and y

2 =
$199:04, which reect the two retailersrelative bargaining powers. To implement the allocation
scheme, we calculate 21 = 2   y2 = $18:97, which means that retailer 2 should make the
side-payment $18:97 to retailer 1. As a result, two retailers will have the prot surpluses
(y1; y

2).
4 The Space-Exchange Problems with Three or More
Retailers
We consider the space exchange problems where n retailers (n  3) exchange their excess
spaces to e¢ ciently utilize the total space resource. We rst construct each retailers prot
function and nd space allocation decisions in Nash equilibrium. Then, in order to examine
the stability of various coalition structures for the space exchange, we develop a cooperative
game model in characteristic-function form, and use the cooperative game concepts (i.e., the
core, the weighted Shapley value) to investigate the fair allocation of the system-wide prot
surplus among n  3 retailers.
4.1 Prot Functions of Retailers in a Space-Exchange Coalition
In the space exchange problem with n  3 retailers (denoted by 1; 2; : : : ; n), each retailer may
join any possible coalition where the retailers determine their optimal host spaces and then
exchange excess spaces with each other. Since any subset of k (1  k  n) retailers may form
a k-retailer coalition, there are
 
n
k

= n!=[k!(n   k)!] possible k-retailer coalitions which we
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denote by C(r; k), for r = 1; 2 : : : ;
 
n
k

and 1  k  n. Moreover, if retailer i = 1; 2; : : : ; n joins
the rth k-retailer coalition C(r; k), then we denote this retailers ordered index in this coalition
by Ii(r; k) = 1; : : : ; k; otherwise, if the k-retailer coalition C(r; k) does not include retailer i,
then this retailers ordered index in this coalition is Ii(r; k) = 0. For example, in a 3-retailer
game with retailers 1, 2, and 3, there are three possible 2-retailer coalitions that are denoted by
C(1; 2) = (1; 2), C(2; 2) = (1; 3) and C(3; 2) = (2; 3). Retailer 1s ordered index in the coalition
C(1; 2) is I1(1; 2) = 1 and his ordered index in the coalition C(2; 2) is I1(2; 2) = 1; but, retailer
1s ordered index in coalition C(3; 2) is I1(3; 2) = 0. The ordered indices of retailers 2 and 3 in
all 2-retailer coalitions are found in a similar manner.
Without loss of generality, we now consider the rth k-retailer coalition C(r; k) involving
retailers 1; 2; : : : ; k. Similar to Section 3.1, we can compute the realized prot of retailer
i 2 C(r; k) who allocates his host space S(r;k)ij 2 [0; Si] to retailer j 2 C i(r; k)  C(r; k)nfig,
and receives the guest space S(r;k)ji 2 [0; Sj] from retailer j. More specically, before retailer i
cooperates with other retailers for the space exchange, this retailer only operates at his host
space Si, and obtains the net prot of
i(Si) = miDii(Si)  hiSi = miiiS
i
i
i   hiSi, for i 2 C(r; k). (14)
Next, we calculate retailer is prot after the retailer exchanges his excess space with the
other retailers in the coalition C(r; k). Similar to Section 3.1, we generalize the Corstjens
and Doyles model [13] to develop a sales model for retailer i 2 C(r; k) at the site of retailer
j 2 C(r; k) as,
Dij(S
(r;k)
ji ) = (S
(r;k)
ji )
ji 
Y
`2C i(r;k)
[`ij + ^
`
ij(S
(r;k)
j` )
ji` ], (15)
where 0 < ji < 1 denotes the direct space elasticity for retailer i at the site of retailer j;
0 < ji` < 1 denotes the cross space elasticity between category i [for retailer i 2 C(r; k)] and
category ` [for retailer ` 2 C i(r; k)] at the site of retailer j; `ij; ^`ij > 0 respectively mean the
scale parameters at the site of retailer j.
When retailer i is a member in the rth k-retailer coalition C(r; k) [that is, i 2 C(r; k)]
and exchanges his excess space with the other retailers, this retailer can realize the prot
i(S
(r;k)
 i ;S
(r;k)
+i ), where
S
(r;k)
 i  fS(r;k)ij : j 2 C i(r; k)g and S(r;k)+i  fS(r;k)ji : j 2 C i(r; k)g,
which, respectively, denote the set of retailer is excess spaces allocated to retailer j 2 C i(r; k)
and the set of the excess spaces that retailer i receives from the other (k   1) retailers (i.e.,
retailers j 2 C i(r; k)). In addition, we dene total excess space (S(r;k) i ) that retailer i 2 C(r; k)
allocates to other retailers in the rth k-retailer coalition C(r; k), and total excess space (S(r;k)+i )
that retailer i receives from other retailers, as follows:
S
(r;k)
 i 
X
j2C i(r;k)
S
(r;k)
ij , and S
(r;k)
+i 
X
j2C i(r;k)
S
(r;k)
ji .
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Similar to Section 3.1, the prot function of retailer i 2 C(r; k) is developed as
i(S
(r;k)
i ;S
(r;k)
+i ) = mi
X
j2C(r;k)
Dij(S
(r;k)
ji ) 
X
j2C(r;k)
hjS
(r;k)
ji , (16)
where S(r;k)i = fSiig [ S(r;k) i . Note that, in (16), when j = i, S(r;k)ii = Si   S(r;k) i , which denotes
retailer is host space that is used for this retailers own sale; and Dij(S
(r;k)
ji ) = Dii(S
(r;k)
ii ),
which represents the prot that retailer i 2 C(r; k) can achieve by using the host space S(r;k)ii
at his own site.
4.2 The Space-Exchange Analysis with n  3 Retailers
We now consider the n-retailer space exchange problem where all retailers in each coalition
make their space allocation decisions in Nash equilibrium. More specically, in the rth k-retailer
coalition C(r; k) (for r = 1; 2 : : : ;
 
n
k

and 1  k  n), all retailers maximize their prots in (16)
in a simultaneous-move setting to make space allocation decisions (i.e., S(r;k)Nij , 8i; j 2 C(r; k)).
Similar to Section 3.2, retailer i 2 C(r; k) need to solve the following constrained maximization
problem:
max
S
(r;k)
ij ;j2C(r;k)
i(S
(r;k)
i ;S
(r;k)
+i ), s.t.
X
j2C(r;k)
j  0 and
X
j2C(r;k)
S
(r;k)
ij = Si, (17)
where i(S
(r;k)
i ;S
(r;k)
+i ) is given as in (16); the rst constraint is considered to assure that all
retailers in the coalition C(r; k) are willing to exchange their spaces; and the second constraint
assures that retailer i fully allocate the total space at his own site among all retailers (including
retailer i himself) in the coalition C(r; k). Using the second constraint, we nd that S(r;k)ii =
Si  
P
j2C i(r;k) S
(r;k)
ij = Si   S(r;k) i , which can be substituted into retailer is prot function
i(S
(r;k)
i ;S
(r;k)
+i ). As a result, retailer is constrained maximization problem in (17) can be
reduced to
max
S
(r;k)
ij ;j2C i(r;k)
i(fSi   S(r;k) i g [ S(r;k) i ;S(r;k)+i ), s.t.
X
j2C(r;k)
j  0, (18)
where retailer i has k   1 decision variables (i.e., S(r;k)ij , for j 2 C i(r; k)).
4.2.1 Nash Equilibrium
We note from (18) that retailer is prot function i(fSi  S(r;k) i g [ S(r;k) i ;S(r;k)+i ) is too compli-
cated and one thus cannot solve the maximization problem to nd closed-form solutions. But,
we can obtain the property of i(fSi S(r;k) i g[S(r;k) i ;S(r;k)+i ), as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Retailer is prot function i(fSi   S(r;k) i g [ S(r;k) i ;S(r;k)+i ) in (18) is a unimodal
function of the retailers decision variables S(r;k)ij , for j 2 C i(r; k). 
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Using the above theorem, we nd that the Nash equilibrium-based space allocation decisions
for each retailer in the coalition C(r; k) possesses the following properties.
Theorem 4 For the space allocation game for the coalition C(r; k), Nash equilibrium must be
unique. Moreover, in Nash equilibrium, retailer i 2 C(r; k) allocates a positive space to each
of the other retailers, i.e., S(r;k)Nij > 0, for j 2 C i(r; k). Such a result means that all retailers
j 2 C i(r; k) must take a part of the excess space at retailer is own site. 
The above theorem indicates that if in any coalition all retailers should share their spaces
each other, which di¤ers from our result for the two-retailer space allocation game in Theorem
1. Specically, when only two retailers consider the space exchange strategy, one retailer may
not decide to allocate any space to the other. That is, the space-exchange strategy may not be
successful when only two retailers are involved. However, as Theorem 4 indicates, if three or
more retailers cooperate with such a strategy, then each retailer will decide to allocate a part
of the space at his own site to each of the other retailers.
4.2.2 Cooperative Game in Characteristic-Function Form
Similar to Section 3.2.2, all retailers in a coalition need a fair allocation that is used to divide
these retailers total prot surplus among them. However, di¤erent from Section 3.2.2, we
now consider the allocation problem for n  3 retailers; thus, we cannot use the generalized
Nash bargaining scheme but need alternative game concepts for our analysis in this section.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern [39] developed a theory of multi-person games where various
subgroups of players might join together to form coalitions. For our n-retailer game where n
retailers possibly form di¤erent coalition structures to exchange their excess spaces, we con-
struct the space-exchange cooperative game in characteristic-function form by computing the
characteristic values of all possible coalitions. For a coalition, the corresponding characteristic
value represents the prot surplus that is jointly achieved by all retailers in this coalition, and
it is thus calculated as the sum of the prot surpluses of all of these retailers. More specically,
1. In the empty coalition ?, there is no retailer and the prot surplus is certainly zero.
Thus, the characteristic value of the empty coalition is v(?) = 0.
2. In a single-retailer coalition C(i; 1)  (i), for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, the retailer does not coop-
erate with any other retailers for the space exchange, and thus, v(i) = 0.
3. In the rth k-retailer coalition C(r; k) with r = 1; 2 : : : ;
 
n
k

and 2  k  n, the k retailers
exchange their excess spaces. Total prot surplus generated by the space exchange is the
sum of all k retailersprot surpluses. That is, v(C(r; k))  Pi2C(r;k)[i(S(r;k)i ;S(r;k)+i )  
i(Si)], which, using (14) and (16), can be calculated as,
v(C(r; k)) =
X
i2C(r;k)
mi
h
Dii(Si   S(r;k) i ) Dii(Si)
i
+
X
i2C(r;k)
X
j2C i(r;k)
miDij(S
(r;k)
ji ).
It is interesting and important to determine whether or not the above cooperative game
in characteristic-function form is essential and superadditive. An essential cooperative game
16
with n players has the property that
P
i2N v(i) < v(N) where N  f1; 2; : : : ; ng; and a game
is superadditive if v(C1 [C2)  v(C1) + v(C2) for any two disjoint coalitions C1 and C2 in the
n-player game; for details, see, for example, Stra¢ n [36].
Theorem 5 When all retailers exchange their locally-optimal excess spaces that maximize
their own prot, we nd that the cooperative game in characteristic-function form is essential
and superadditive. 
The above theorem shows that a coalition with more retailers will enjoy a higher prot
surplus from the space-exchange strategy. This implies that a greater number of retailers
should cooperate, in order to prot more from space exchange.
4.2.3 Allocation of the System-Wide Prot Surplus
As Theorem 5 indicates, the retailers in our n-player (n  3) cooperative game in characteristic-
function form should have incentives to join the grand coalition C(n). Since there is only one
grand coalition and thus r = 1 in the coalition C(r; n), for notational simplicity we omit r in
this notation for the grand coalition. This happens because the total prot surplus generated
by all retailers in C(n) that is the characteristic value of C(n), i.e., v(C(n)) is no less than
sum of prot surpluses achieved by retailers in all disjoint, less-than-n-retailer, but nonempty
coalitions. This means that the grand coalition C(n) is stable if v(C(n)) is allocated to all
retailers in a fair way. More specically, if the allocation to each retailer is no smaller than
what this retailer would obtain after leaving the grand coalition, then all retailers would be
willing to stay in the grand coalition which is thus stable. Otherwise, the retailer would leave
the grand coalition C(n), which is thus unstable and would disperse.
The Core We now consider the fair allocation of the characteristic value v(C(n)) to ensure
the stability of the grand coalition C(n). Letting yi denote the prot surplus allocated to
retailer i, for i 2 C(n) = f1; 2; : : : ; ng, we represent a proper allocation scheme by using
an n-tuple of numbers y  (y1; y2; : : : ; yn) with the following two properties: (i) individual
rationality, i.e., yi  v(i), for all i 2 C(n); (ii) collective rationality, i.e.,
P
i2C(n) yi = v(C(n)).
Note that the n-tuple (y1; y2; : : : ; yn) satisfying the above two properties is called an imputation
for the game G = (C(n); v); see Stra¢ n [36]. In cooperative game theory there are a number of
concepts that could be used for our analysis for the n-player cooperative game in characteristic
form. One of the most important concepts is the core [18], which is dened as the set of all
undominated imputations (y1; y2; : : : ; yn) such that for all coalitions T  C(n) = f1; 2; : : : ; ng,
we have
P
i2T yi  v(T ).
Theorem 6 When three or more retailers exchange their Nash equilibrium-based excess spaces,
the core of our n-retailer cooperative game in characteristic function is non-empty. That is, for
this case, the grand coalition C(n) is stable if all retailers implement an allocation scheme in
the core. 
17
As the above theorem indicates, any imputation in the non-empty core represents a fair
allocation scheme that ensures the stability of the grand coalition C(n). However, since the
core is a set of many imputations, one may need the answer to the following question: Which
imputation in the core should be applied to the allocation of the system-wide prot surplus
v(C(n))? Thus, it would be interesting to nd a unique allocation solution for our cooperative
game, even though some researchers [e.g., Hamlen et al. [19]] believe that a unique solution
does not permit any exibility in management.
The Weighted Shapley Value In the theory of cooperative games, Shapley value [35]
represents a unique imputation (y1; y2; : : : ; yn) where the payo¤s yi (i = 1; 2; : : : ; ; n) are dis-
tributed fairly by an outside arbitrator, using the following three axioms (i) symmetry;
(ii) zero allocation to dummy player; and (iii) additivity. However, for our space-exchange
game, we cannot use Shapley value to uniquely allocate the maximum prot surplus v(C(n))
among n retailers in the grand coalition C(n), because we allow unequal bargaining powers of
all retailers and thus Axiom (i) may not be satised.
In the theory of cooperative games, the concept of weighted Shapley valuecan be used to
fairly allocate the prot surplus or cost saving among n  3 players with di¤erent bargaining
powers. This concept was introduced by Shapley [34]; and then discussed by a number of
economists and mathematicians. But, very few publications used the concept to analyze game
problems in the business area. A representative publication is Loehman and Whinston [29],
who applied the weighted Shapley value to an allocation problem in accounting. But, in [29],
the weighted Shapley value may be outside the core and cannot assure the stability of the
grand coalition. Di¤erent from [29], we will adopt a new approach to compute the weighted
Shapley value that must be in the core. Next, we briey describe the concept and introduce
our approach.
The weighted Shapley value associates a positive weight to each of k players who join a
k-player coalition and share the total prot surplus (in this k-retailer coalition) according to
their weights. For our space-exchange problem, we shall determine the weighted Shapley value
by using Harsanyis procedure [22], where the weighted Shapley value can be calculated in
terms of the following weight set,
w  fw(r; k), for r = 1; 2 : : : ;

n
k

and 2  k  ng, (19)
with
w(r; k) 

wi(r; k) : 0  wi(r; k)  1 and
X
i2C(r;k)
wi(r; k) = 1, for i 2 C(r; k)

, (20)
where wi(r; k) denotes retailer is weight in the coalition C(r; k), in which k retailers share
the prot surplus v(C(r; k)) according to their weights wi(r; k) (i = 1; 2; : : : ; k). The weighted
Shapley value (allocation) yi of retailer i (for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) is equal to the total accumulated
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residuals allocated to this retailer, i.e.,
yi =
Xn
k=1
"i(k), for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. (21)
where "i(k) denotes all residuals that are allocated to retailer i = 1; 2; : : : ; n in all possible
k-retailer coalitions that retailer i could join, and it is computed as
"i(k) =
X(nk)
r=1
"Ii(r;k)(r; k) 1Ii(r;k)>0,
where "Ii(r;k)(r; k) denotes the residual that is allocated to retailer i who is the Ii(r; k)-th player
in the coalition C(r; k); 1Ii(r;k)>0 = 1 when Ii(r; k) > 0, and 1Ii(r;k)>0 = 0 when Ii(r; k) = 0.
Hamlen et al. [19] showed that there must exist a convex set of some weight sets each
yielding a unique weighted Shapley value that is in the core (if the core is non-empty). We
denote by   the convex set of all weight sets that make the weighted Shapley value to satisfy
the core conditions. Because Theorem 6 indicates that the core of our space-exchange game
is non-empty, the set   must be non-empty, and we can choose any weight set in   to nd a
weighted Shapley value that satises the core condition and ensures the stability of the grand
coalition C(n).
Next, we focus on the question of which weight set in   should be chosen to reect the
retailersbargaining powers (1; 2; : : : ; n). Loehman and Whinston [29] set the weights of
all retailers in a coalition to their relative bargaining powers in this coalition. Consider the
coalition C(r; k), for r = 1; 2; : : : ;
 
n
k

and k = 1; 2; : : : ; n. If these k retailers have their
bargaining powers (1; 2; : : : ; k), then the weight wi(r; k) of retailer i is equal to his relative
bargaining power ^i(r; k), i.e.,
wi(r; k) = ^i(r; k)  i
.Xk
j=1
j , for i = 1; 2; : : : ; k. (22)
However, Loehman and Whinston [29] cannot guarantee that the weight set LW 2   (where
LW is the set of Loehman and Whinstons relative bargaining powers). Thus, we suggest an
approach to nd the weights that reect bargaining powers (1; 2; : : : ; n) and also satisfy
the core conditions.
Because each weight set w in   must yield a weighted Shapley value that is in the core,
there must exist a weight set w^ (in  ) that is the closest to LW [29]. More specically, if
LW is in  , then we select it as the weight set w^, i.e., w^ = LW , as illustrated in Figure 1(a);
otherwise, if LW is not in  , then we use the weight set (in  ) that is the closest to LW , as
illustrated in Figure 1(b). It is easy to justify that the set w^ reects the bargaining powers,
because, as the bargaining powers (1; 2; : : : ; n) change, then LW also changes and the set
w^ accordingly changes.
In order to nd w^, we need to minimize the distance between w and LW , subject to the
weighted Shapley value in terms of the setw satises the core conditions. The distance between
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Figure 1: The calculation of the weight set w^ that is in   and thus makes the corresponding
weighted Shapley value to satisfy the core conditions and also reects the retailersbargaining
powers.
w and LW is denoted by kw   LWk, which is calculated as
kw   LWk 
nX
k=1
(nk)X
r=1
X
i2C(r;k)
[wi(r; k)  ^i(r; k)]2. (23)
Hence, we can use w^ to nd a unique weighted Shapley value that satises the core conditions
and reects the retailersbargaining powers.
Theorem 7 The unique weighted Shapley value (allocation) that ensures the stability of the
grand coalition is y^ = (y^1; y^2; : : : ; y^n), where y^i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) is computed by using (21)
with the weight set w^. The weight set w^ is the unique solution of the following constrained
non-linear programming problem:
minw kw   LWk
s.t.
P
i2C(r;k)
yi  v(C(r; k)), for r = 1; 2; : : : ;
 
n
k

and k = 1; 2; : : : ; n;P
i2C(r;k)
wi(r; k) = 1, for r = 1; 2; : : : ;
 
n
k

and k = 1; 2; : : : ; n.
(24)
[Note that in this problem we use (21) to obtain yi (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n), which is a function of a
given weight set w.] 
The weighted Shapley value computed by using Theorem 7 must be in the core, because
of the following reason: The weight set w^ is obtained by solving the constrained minimization
problem in (24). Thus, the weighted Shapley value y^ = (y^1; y^2; : : : ; y^n) in terms of w^ must
satisfy the constraint
P
i2C(r;k) y^i  v(C(r; k)), for r = 1; 2; : : : ;
 
n
k

and k = 1; 2; : : : ; n. That
is, for all coalitions T  C(n) = f1; 2; : : : ; ng, we nd that Pi2T y^i  v(T ), which means that
the weighted Shapley value is in the core.
In order to justify that the weighted Shapley value reects the bargaining powers, we
consider the following case: Assuming that retailer i has more bargaining power (i.e., the value
of i increases) but other retailersbargaining powers are unchanged, we nd from (22) that,
in any coalition C(r; k) that retailer i joins, this retailers relative bargaining power increases,
that is, ^i(r; k) increases. As Theorem 7 shows, we nd that retailer is allocation weight
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w^i(r; k) in the set w^ must also increase because we nd w^ by minimizing kw   LWk which is
dened by (23). Moreover, we note that, when LW is not in the core, the weight set w^ that
are found by using our approach must be on the edge of the convex set  .
4.2.4 Two Numerical Examples for the Space Exchange Analysis with Three Re-
tailers
In order to illustrate our analysis, we now consider a three-retailer space exchange problem
and present two numerical examples one with LW in the set   and one with LW outside the
set  .
Example 1 We consider three retailers (i.e., retailers 1, 2, and 3). The three retailerspa-
rameter values are supposed as in Table 2, where some parameters (e.g., mi, hi, and i, for
i = 1; 2) for retailers 1 and 2 are assumed to take the numerical values in Section 3.2.3. As
discussed previously, we need to consider each possible coalition and calculate corresponding
space allocation decisions in Nash equilibrium. Since a single retailer cannot implement the
space exchange strategy, we should solve four space exchange games for three two-player games
and one three-player game.
m1 m2 m3 h1 h2 h3 S1 S2 S3 1 2 3 
1
12 
2
12 
3
12 
1
13 
2
13
15 25 9 4 6 5 100 60 50 3 8 6 0:1 0:2 0:1 0:1 0:1
313 
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2
23 
3
23 
2
11 ^
2
11 
3
11 ^
3
11 
2
12 ^
2
12 
3
12 ^
3
12 
2
13 ^
2
13 
3
13 ^
3
13 
1
21
0:2 0:2 0:2 0:1 4 0:3 1 0:4 1 0:2 3 0:3 2 0:1 1 0:1 3
^121 
3
21 ^
3
21 
1
22 ^
1
22 
3
22 ^
3
22 
1
23 ^
1
23 
3
23 ^
3
23 
1
31 ^
1
31 
2
31 ^
2
31 
1
32 ^
1
32
0:3 4 0:2 6 0:4 3 0:3 5 0:2 4 0:1 4 0:1 3 0:1 3 0:2
232 ^
2
32 
1
33 ^
1
33 
2
33 ^
2
33 
1
1 
2
1 
3
1 
1
2 
2
2 
3
2 
1
3 
2
3 
3
3
4 0:3 2 0:1 3 0:2 0:5 0:4 0:3 0:3 0:4 0:6 0:4 0:4 0:5
Table 2: The parameter values in the numerical example for the three-retailer decentralized
case with LW in the set  .
For the coalition f1; 2g where only retailers 1 and 2 exchange their spaces, we nd that
S
f1;2gN
11 = 82:68 sq. ft., S
f1;2gN
12 = 17:32 sq. ft.; S
f1;2gN
21 = 11:93 sq. ft., and S
f1;2gN
22 = 48:07
sq. ft., as given in Section 3.2.3. For the coalition f1; 3g where only retailers 1 and 3 exchange
their spaces, we nd that Sf1;3gN11 = 38:89 sq. ft., S
f1;3gN
13 = 61:11 sq. ft.; S
f1;3gN
31 = 6:56 sq.
ft., and Sf1;3gN33 = 43:45 sq. ft. For the coalition f2; 3g where only retailers 2 and 3 exchange
their spaces, we nd that Sf2;3gN22 = 39:41 sq. ft., S
f2;3gN
23 = 20:59 sq. ft.; S
f2;3gN
33 = 42:77 sq.
ft., and Sf2;3gN32 = 7:23 sq. ft. For the grand coalition f1; 2; 3g where three retailers exchange
their spaces each other, we compute the Nash equilibrium-based space allocation decisions (in
sq. ft.) as follows:
S
f1;2;3gN
11 S
f1;2;3gN
12 S
f1;2;3gN
13 S
f1;2;3gN
21 S
f1;2;3gN
22 S
f1;2;3gN
23 S
f1;2;3gN
31 S
f1;2;3gN
32 S
f1;2;3gN
33
77.56 4.17 18.27 2.83 52.74 4.43 11.38 5.55 33.07
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Next, we use our formulas in Section 4.2.2 to construct a cooperative game in characteristic-
function form as,
v(?) = v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 0,
v(12) = 1108:11, v(13) = 646:46, v(23) = 3271:81, v(123) = 3565:28.
Since v(ij) > v(i) + v(j) and v(123) > v(ij) + v(k) for i; j; k = 1; 2; 3 and i 6= j 6= k, the
game is essential and superadditive with a nonempty core. In order to nd a unique weighted
Shapley value, we rst examine whether or not Loehman and Whinstons weight set LW [29]
is in the set  . To do so, we need to follow Harsanyis procedure to nd the weighted Shapley
value in terms of LW as follows: y1 = 259:86, y2 = 1987:93, y3 = 1317:49. It is easy to verify
that yi > v(i) = 0 and yi + yj > v(ij), for i; j = 1; 2; 3 and i 6= j; and y1 + y2 + y3 = v(123).
This means that the weighted Shapley value in terms of the weight set LW is in the core; so,
it is used for our allocation. Note that we can also solve the nonlinear problem in Theorem 7
to nd w^ = LW . 
In the above example, we nd that, when we use the weight set LW suggested by Loehman
andWhinston [29], the weighted Shapley value is in the core. Next, we provide another example
in which LW is not in the core and we thus have to use our method in Theorem 7 to nd a
unique weighted Shapley value.
Example 2 We still consider the three retailers of Example 1 but change some parameter
values to the following: S2 = 70 sq. ft., 2 = 5, and 3 = 4. Similar to Example Example 1,
we can compute the space allocation decisions in Nash equilibrium for all possible coalitions,
and construct a cooperative game in the characteristic-function form as
v(?) = v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 0,
v(12) = 1129:96, v(13) = 646:46, v(23) = 3317:48, v(123) = 3639:38,
which is essential and superadditive with a nonempty core, because v(ij) > v(i) + v(j) and
v(123) > v(ij) + v(k) for i; j; k = 1; 2; 3 and i 6= j 6= k. But, using Loehman and Whinstons
weight set LW , we compute the weighted Shapley value as y1 = 337:15, y2 = 1943:22, and
y3 = 1359:01. We nd that y2 + y3 = 3302:23 < v(23) = 3317:48; this means that the weighted
Shapley value in terms of the weight set LW is not in the core. Thus, we use our method
in Theorem 7 to nd a unique weighted Shapley value as y^1 = 322:26, y^2 = 1954:54, and
y^3 = 1362:58, which satises the core conditions and also reects the bargaining powers of
three retailers. For details regarding our computation, see online Appendix B. 
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper is motivated by the practice of Waitrose and Boots/Welcome Break (and also,
Tim Hortons and Cold Stone Creamery) where these retailers exchange their excess spaces
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to increase their prots. We consider a two-retailer problem and an n-retailer problem with
n  3. For each problem, we calculate the space allocation decisions in Nash equilibrium,
and use cooperative game theory to allocate the system-wide prot surplus resulting from
space exchange between two or among three or more retailers to assure that the retailers with
di¤erent bargaining powers are willing to cooperate for the space exchange. Specically, we
use the generalized Nash bargaining scheme to allocate the system-wide prot surplus for the
two-retailer case, and apply the weighted Shapley value to divide the surplus for the n retailer
case (n  3). We proposed a new approach to compute a unique weighted Shapley value that
assures the stability of the grand coalition and reects the retailersrelative bargaining powers.
In addition to our contributions to the literature, as summarized in Section 2.3, there are
six major managerial insights as follows:
1. For the two-retailer case, we nd that, in Nash equilibrium, the retailer with a higher
value of the ratio of the operating cost to the prot margin (i.e., hi=mi, for i = 1; 2)
should secure less host space and allocate more to the other retailer.
2. For the two-retailer case, each retailer may decide to secure all space at his own site.
That is, if only two retailers are involved, then they may or may not decide to exchange
their spaces.
3. Under the allocation scheme for the two-retailer case, a retailer should make a payment
transfer to the other retailer. The side payment depends on the comparison between two
retailersrelative prot surpluses and their relative bargaining powers.
4. For the n-retailer case with n  3, we show that, in Nash equilibrium, each retailer should
allocate a positive part of his space to each of the other retailers. That is, di¤erent from
the two-retailer case, in the n-retailer case any two retailers will exchange their spaces.
5. When three or more retailers cooperate for the space exchange, a positive system-wide
prot surplus will be generated. Moreover, a fair allocation scheme must exist such that
all retailers can prot more from the space exchange and thus willing to exchange their
spaces.
6. The space exchange by more retailers will result in a higher system-wide prot surplus
and thus a higher allocation to each retailer under a fair scheme. This means that a
greater number of retailers should cooperate, in order to prot more from the space
exchange.
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Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Temporarily ignoring constraints in (7), we rst nd the optimal
solution that maximizes i(Sii;Sjj) in (5), where i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j. Taking the rst- and
second-order derivatives of i(Sii;Sjj) w.r.t. Sii yields
di(Sii;Sjj)
dSii
= mi
i
iS
ii 1
ii [ii + ^ii(Si   Sii)
i
i` ] mi^iiii`S
i
i
ii (Si   Sii)
i
i` 1   hi, (25)
d2i(Sii;Sjj)
dS2ii
= mi
i
i(
i
i   1)S
i
i 2
ii [ii + ^ii(Si   Sii)
i
i` ]  2miii^iiii`S
i
i 1
ii (Si   Sii)
i
i` 1
+mi^ii
i
i`(
i
i`   1)S
i
i
ii (Si   Sii)
i
i` 2,
which is negative because 0 < ii; 
i
i` < 1. Therefore, retailer is prot function i(Sii;Sjj) is
strictly concave in Sii. This means that we can uniquely compute retailer is optimal decision
S^ii that maximizes i(Sii;Sjj), by equating di(Sii;Sjj)=dSii in (25) to zero and solving the
resulting equation for Sii. However, due to the complexity of di(Sii;Sjj)=dSii, we cannot nd
the analytic solution for S^ii but can conclude that S^ii uniquely satises
ii
i
iS
ii 1
ii + ^iiS
ii 1
ii (Si   Sii)
i
i` 1[ii(Si   Sii)  ^iiii`Sii] = hi=mi.
The above is independent of Sjj, which is attributed to the fact that, under the space-exchange
strategy, each retailer can only determine the allocation of his own space. It thus follows that
Nash equilibrium (SN11; S
N
22) for the simultaneous-move game must be unique. Next, we consider
the constraints in (5) to calculate SN11 and S
N
22.
1. We rst consider the constraint 1 + 2  0, where, using (6),
1 + 2 = m1[D11(S11) D11(S1)] +m2D21(S1   S11)
+m2[D22(S22) D22(S2)] +m1D12(S2   S22),
which is, of course, zero when Sii = Si (i = 1; 2). However, we cannot draw any result
for the sign of 1 + 2, when Sii < Si. Next, assuming that Sii < Si, we examine the
sign of the following term (in 1 + 2)
m1[D11(S11) D11(S1)] +m2D21(S1   S11), (26)
which depends on whether or notD11(S11) is greater thanD11(S1). We learn from (3) that
D11(S11) = S
11
11 [11 + ^11(S1   S11)112 ]. To compare D11(S11) and D11(S1), we calculate
1
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the rst- and second-order derivatives of the function D11(S11) w.r.t. S11 as follows:
d[D11(S11)]
dS11
= 11S
11 1
11 [11 + ^11(S1   S11)
1
12 ]  ^11112S
1
1
11 (S1   S11)
1
12 1,
d2[D11(S11)]
dS211
= 11(
1
1   1)S
1
1 2
11 [11 + ^11(S1   S11)
1
12 ]
 2^1111112S
1
1 1
11 (S1   S11)
1
12 1 + ^11
1
12(
1
12   1)S
1
1
11 (S1   S11)
1
12 2,
which is negative because 0 < 11; 
1
12 < 1. This means that the function D11(S11) is a
strictly concave function of S11. Moreover, we can easily nd that
D11(0) = 0,
d[D11(S11)]
dS11

S11=0
= +1; D11(S1) = 11S
1
1
11 ,
d[D11(S11)]
dS11

S11=S1
=  1.
We plot Figure 2 to visionally show the function D11(S11), and nd that there must exist
a point z1 2 (0; S1) such that, 8S11 2 [z1; S1) or 8S12 2 [0; S1   z1), D11(S11)  D11(S1).
Figure 2: The shape of the function D11(S11) where S11 = S1   S12.
From the above, we nd that, if S11  z1, then D11(S11)  D11(S1) and the term (26)
in 1 + 2 must be non-negative. Similarly, there also must exist the point z2. If
S22  z2, then D22(S22)  D22(S2). Thus, if S^ii (i = 1; 2) which maximizes i(Sii;Sjj),
where j = 1; 2 and j 6= i is greater than or equal to zi, then retailer i should choose
S^ii as his optimal solution when the other constraint (i.e., 0  Sii  Si) is ignored.
Otherwise, retailer is optimal solution should zi.
2. We then consider the constraint 0  Sii  Si, under which if S^ii  Si, then retailer i
should choose S^ii as his optimal solution when the rst constraint (i.e., 1 + 2  0)
is ignored. Otherwise, retailer is optimal solution should Si.
Noting that zi 2 (0; Si) (for i = 1; 2), we can use the above discussion to nd two retailers
space allocation decisions in Nash equilibrium as min(max(S^ii; zi); Si), which can be written as
given in this theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 2. Let G(y1; y2) denote the objective function in (11), i.e., G(y1; y2) 
y
1
1 y
2
2 . Since y1 + y2 = 1 + 2, we substitute y2 = (1 + 2)   y1 into G(y1; y2), and
obtain the objective function only in terms of the variable y1 asG(y1) = y
1
1 [(1+2) y1]2 .
Next, we temporarily ignore the non-negative constraints y1  0 and y2  0, and compute the
optimal solution y1 that maximizes G(y1).
Because two retailers obtain positive allocations when 1+2 > 0, we nd that G(y1) >
0, and we can thus compute y1 by simply maximizing the logarithm of G(y1) which is written
as
ln[G(y1)] = 1 ln y1 + 2 ln[(1 + 2)  y1].
Taking the rst- and second-order derivatives of ln[G(y1)] w.r.t. y1, we have
d ln[G(y1)]
dy1
=
1
y1
  2
(1 + 2)  y1 ,
d2 ln[G(y1)]
dy21
=  1
y21
  2
[(1 + 2)  y1]2  0,
which implies that ln[G(y1)] is concave in y1. We solve d ln[G(y1)]=dy1 = 0 and nd the optimal
solution y1 as shown in (12), and then compute y

2 = (1+ 2)  y1 which can be simplied
to the result in (12). It is easy to justify that yi  0 (i = 1; 2) and the nonnegative constraints
in (11) are satised. This proves the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3. According to Section 4.1, we write the retailers prot function as,
i(fSi   S(r;k) i g [ S(r;k) i ;S(r;k)+i )
= mi
X
j2C(r;k)
Dij(S
(r;k)
ji ) 
X
j2C(r;k)
hjS
(r;k)
ji
= mi
8><>:
0@Si   X
j2C i(r;k)
S
(r;k)
ij
1AiiY
`2C i(r;k)
[`ii + ^
`
ii(S
(r;k)
i` )
ii` ]
9>=>;
 hi
0@Si   X
j2C i(r;k)
S
(r;k)
ij
1A
+mi
X
j2C i(r;k)

(S
(r;k)
ji )
ji
Y
`2C i(r;k)
[`ij + ^
`
ij(S
(r;k)
j` )
ji` ]

 
X
j2C i(r;k)
hjS
(r;k)
ji , (27)
where retailer is decision variables appear only in the rst two terms. We denote the rst two
terms in (27) by Z; that is,
Z  miZ^   hi(Si  
X
j2C i(r;k)
S
(r;k)
ij ), (28)
where
Z^  Z^ii1
Y
j2C i(r;k)
Z^j (29)
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with
Z^1  Si  
X
j2C i(r;k)
S
(r;k)
ij and Z^j  jii + ^jii(S(r;k)ij )
i
ij , for j 2 C i(r; k).
We begin by investigating the property of Z. Taking the logarithm of Z^, we nd that
  ln(Z^) = ii ln(Z^1) +
X
j2C i(r;k)
ln(Z^j). (30)
Partially di¤erentiating  once and twice w.r.t. S(r;k)ij (j 2 C i(r; k)) yields,
@
@S
(r;k)
ij
=   
i
i
Si  
P
j2C i(r;k) S
(r;k)
ij
+
^jii
i
ij(S
(r;k)
ij )
iij 1
jii + ^
j
ii(S
(r;k)
ij )
iij
,
and
@2
@(S
(r;k)
ij )
2
=   
i
ih
Si  
P
j2C i(r;k) S
(r;k)
ij
i2   ^jiiiij(1  iij)(S(r;k)ij )iij 2
jii + ^
j
ii(S
(r;k)
ij )
iij
 2(^
j
ii
i
ij)
2(S
(r;k)
ij )
2(iij 1)h
jii + ^
j
ii(S
(r;k)
ij )
iij
i2 , (31)
which is negative because 0 < iij < 1. To nd whether or not the function  is jointly concave
in k 1 variables S(r;k)ij , for j 2 C i(r; k), we also need to examine the signs of leading principle
minors in the corresponding Hessian matrix. We calculate the second cross derivative of 
w.r.t. S(r;k)ij and S
(r;k)
i` (j; ` 2 C i(r; k) and j 6= `) as follows:
@2
@S
(r;k)
ij @S
(r;k)
i`
=  0, where 0  
i
ih
Si  
P
j2C i(r;k) S
(r;k)
ij
i2 . (32)
Assuming without loss of generality that in the coalition C(r; k), j 2 C i(r; k) = f1; 2; : : : ; k 
1g and i = k, we can construct the Hessian matrix as,
H =
26666664
@2
@(S
(r;k)
i1 )
2
 0     0
 0 @2
@(S
(r;k)
i2 )
2
    0
           
 0  0    @2
@(S
(r;k)
i;k 1)2
37777775 , (33)
where @2=@(S(r;k)ij )
2 and 0 are given as in (31) and (32), respectively. We also nd from (31)
and (32) that
@2
@(S
(r;k)
ij )
2
=
@2
@S
(r;k)
ij @S
(r;k)
i`
  ^
j
ii
i
ij(1  iij)(S(r;k)ij )
i
ij 2
jii + ^
j
ii(S
(r;k)
ij )
iij
  2(^
j
ii
i
ij)
2(S
(r;k)
ij )
2(iij 1)h
jii + ^
j
ii(S
(r;k)
ij )
iij
i2 .
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Hence, the Hessian matrix can be transformed to the following reduced rowechelon form:
H 0 =
2666664
 i1 0    i;k 1
0  i2    i;k 1
           
0 0     i;k 1

1 + 0 
P
j2C i(r;k)

1
ij

3777775 ,
where
ij =
^jii
i
ij(1  iij)(S(r;k)ij )
i
ij 2
jii + ^
j
ii(S
(r;k)
ij )
iij
+
2(^jii
i
ij)
2(S
(r;k)
ij )
2(iij 1)h
jii + ^
j
ii(S
(r;k)
ij )
iij
i2 > 0, for j =2 C i(r; k).
We nd that the sign of the i th leading principal minor of the reduced matrix H 0 is ( 1)i,
which implies that the Hessian matrix H in (33) is negative denite. Noting that all diagonal
elements of H (@2=@(S(r;k)ij )
2) are negative, we conclude that the function  in (30) is jointly
concave in S(r;k)ij , for j 2 C i(r; k).
It follows from the above that Z^ in (29) is a log-concave function of S(r;k)ij (j 2 C i(r; k)).
Recall that the maximization of i(fSi S(r;k) i g[S(r;k) i ;S(r;k)+i ) is equivalent to the maximization
of Z in (28), where a linear function of Z^ and decision variables S(r;k)ij (j 2 C i(r; k)). Therefore,
retailer is prot function is a unimodal function of his decision variables.
Proof of Theorem 4. We rst show the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. Note from
Theorem 3 that each retailers prot function is unimodal of his decision variables. For this
proof, we should investigate the constraint
P
j2C(r;k) j  0, which means that all retailers
can jointly benet from space exchange. That is, if, given S(r;k)ji for j 2 C i(r; k), retailer is
optimal solutions S(r;k)ij that maximize i(fSi   S(r;k) i g [ S(r;k) i ;S(r;k)+i ) are greater than zero,
then all retailers are better o¤ from sharing their spaces and the constraint
P
j2C(r;k) j  0
is redundant.
We now show that S(r;k)ij (8j 2 C i(r; k)) must be greater than zero. Note that sinceP
j2C i(r;k) S
(r;k)
ij = S
(r;k)
 i , there must exist j 2 C i(r; k) such that S(r;k)ij > 0. We assume
that retailer s optimal solution S(r;k)i = 0 ( 2 C i(r; k)), which means that this retailer
does not operate in retailer is excess space. We compare the current prot (r;k) i in (16)
(when S(r;k)i = 0) with that denoted by ~
(r;k)
 i 
P
j2C i(r;k)mj
~Dji( ~S
(r;k)
ij )  hiS(r;k) i  for the
following case: Retailer j allocates a positive space A which is greater than zero but smaller
than S(r;k)ij , i.e., 0 < A < S
(r;k)
ij  to retailer  who then operates at the space A. Note that,
for retailer  2 C i(r; k), ~S(r;k)i = A; for retailer j 2 C i(r; k), ~S(r;k)ij = S(r;k)ij   A; for other
retailers ` 2 C i(r; k)nfj; g, ~S(r;k)i` = S(r;k)i` .
We calculate the di¤erence between ~(r;k) i and 
(r;k)
 i as,
~
(r;k)
 i   (r;k) i =
X
j2C i(r;k)
mj[ ~Dji( ~S
(r;k)
ij ) Dji(S(r;k)ij )]. (34)
It easily follows that ~Di( ~S
(r;k)
i )   Di(S(r;k)i ) = ~Di(A)   Di(0) = ~Di(A) > 0. For retailer
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j 2 C i(r; k), the di¤erence between ~Dji( ~S(r;k)ij ) and Dji(S(r;k)ij ) is specied as,
~Dji( ~S
(r;k)
ij ) Dji(S(r;k)ij ) =
Y
`2C(r;k)nfj;g
[`ji+^
`
ji(S
(r;k)
i` )
ij` ][( ~S(r;k)ij )
i
j(ji+^

jiA
ij) (S(r;k)ij )
i
jji],
where ~S(r;k)ij = S
(r;k)
ij   A. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we can show that there exists a
number z1 such that, if ~S
(r;k)
ij > z1 (which means that A is a su¢ ciently-small positive number),
then ( ~S(r;k)ij )
ij(ji + ^

jiA
ij) > (S
(r;k)
ij )
ijji and thus, ~Dji( ~S
(r;k)
ij ) > Dji(S
(r;k)
ij ).
For retailer  2 C i(r; k)nfj; g, we nd that
~Di( ~S
(r;k)
i ) Di(S(r;k)i ) = (S(r;k)i )
i
 
Y
`2C(r;k)nf;j;g
[`i + ^
`
i(
~S
(r;k)
i` )
i` ]
fji^iA
i
 + ^ji[(
~S
(r;k)
ij )
ij(i + ^

iA
i)  (S(r;k)ij )
i
ji]g,
which is positive, i.e., ~Di( ~S
(r;k)
i ) > Di(S
(r;k)
i ), because, similar to our above proof for the result
that ~Dji( ~S
(r;k)
ij ) > Dji(S
(r;k)
ij ), we can easily nd that ( ~S
(r;k)
ij )
ij(i + ^

iA
i) > (S
(r;k)
ij )
iji.
Therefore, we nd that ~(r;k) i > 
(r;k)
 i , which is contrary to our above assumption that
9 2 C i(r; k): S(r;k)i = 0. It follows that the constraint
P
j2C(r;k) j  0 is redundant and
each retailer must allocate a positive space to any other retailer. Moreover, similar to the proof
of Theorem 1, we can conclude that Nash equilibrium for the non-cooperative game must be
unique. This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 5. In order to prove that a cooperative game is essential, we must show
that
P
i2N v(C(i; 1)) < v(N) in which N  f1; 2; : : : ; ng and n  3. As shown in Theorem
4, for any coalition, each retailer does not secure all of his host space but allocates a part to
each of other retailers. This means that all retailers in the grand coalition must operate at
retailer is store. That is, SNij > 0, for j 2 Nnfig. However, when we calculate
P
i2N v(C(i; 1)),
we do not consider the excess spaces allocated by retailer i to other (n   1) retailers. This
means that the characteristic value
P
i2N v(C(i; 1)) corresponds to the solutions Sij = 0, for
j 2 Nnfig, which are not optimal, as shown in Theorem 4; thus, v(N) >Pi2N v(C(i; 1)) = 0,
which means that the game is essential.
Next, we prove that the game could be superadditive. In order to show this, we need to
prove that v(C1 [ C2)  v(C1) + v(C2) for any two disjoint, nonempty coalitions C1 and C2
such that Ci 6= ? (i = 1; 2) [nonempty] and C1 \ C2 = ? [disjoint]. To simplify our
proof, we next consider the k retailer coalition C(r; k) and use general notations C1 and C2
to represent two space-exchange coalitions. Note that even though all retailers in the coalition
C(r; k) may form more than two disjoint coalitions, we can still arrive to this theorem if
v(C1 [ C2)  v(C1) + v(C2) for any two disjoint, nonempty coalitions Ci (i = 1; 2) such that
Ci 6= ? and C1 \ C2 = ?. For example, if, for three disjoint, nonempty coalitions Ci 6= ?
(i = 1; 2; 3), we have v(C1 [ C2 [ C3)  v(C1 [ C2) + v(C3) and v(C1 [ C2)  v(C1) + v(C2),
then v(C1 [ C2 [ C3)  v(C1) + v(C2) + v(C3).
For this proof, we need to consider the following two cases:
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1. Both C1 and C2 are single-retailer coalitions and C1 [ C2 is a two-retailer
coalition. As shown in Theorem 1, after two retailers secure their host spaces SNii
(i = 1; 2) and exchange their excess retail spaces, the system-wide expected prot must
be no smaller than that before space exchange. This means that v(C1[C2) = 1+2 
v(C1) + v(C2) = 0.
2. Both C1 and C2 are nonempty coalitions, and at least one of C1 and C2 is a
morethan-one-retailer coalition. For this case, C1 [ C2 is the k retailer coalition
C(r; k) with k  3; that is, C1 [ C2 = C(r; k). We nd from Theorem 4 that, when
the two coalitions C1 and C2 merge, all retailers share their spaces one another, and
enjoy a positive prot surplus. When we calculate v(C1) + v(C2), we do not consider
the space that retailer i allocates to the retailers in the coalition C2. This means that
the characteristic value v(C1) + v(C2) corresponds to the solutions (S
(r;k)
ij , i; j 2 C(r; k))
such that S(r;k)ij > 0 when retailer j is in the coalition C1, and S
(r;k)
ij = 0 when retailer
j is in the coalition C2. Such a solution is not optimal; thus, v(C1 [ C2) [which equals
v(C(r; k))] must be greater than v(C1) + v(C2), i.e., v(C1 [ C2) > v(C1) + v(C2).
This proves the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 6. This follows Theorem 5. More specically, we assume that all
retailers form z (z  2) disjoint, less-than-n-retailer but nonempty coalitions C1; C2; : : : ; Cz;
that is, Ci 6= ? and Ci  C(n), for i = 1; 2; : : : ; z; Ci \Cj = ?, for i; j = 1; 2; : : : ; z, i 6= j; and
[zi=1Ci = C(n). Thus, the total prot surpluses achieved by all retailers in the coalitions Ci
(i = 1; 2; : : : ; z) is
Pz
i=1 v(Ci), which is no more than v(C(n)) according to Theorem 5. This
proves the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 7. We can solve the constrained non-linear problem to nd w^ which must
exist according to Hamlen et al. [19], and which is unique because   is a convex set. Therefore,
the weighted Shapley value y^ in terms of w^ must ensure the stability of the grand coalition
(because the resulting weighted Shapley value is in the core) and reects the bargaining powers
of n retailers (because changing the bargaining powers yields a di¤erent set w^ and a di¤erent
weighted Shapley value).
Appendix B The Calculation of a UniqueWeighted Shap-
ley Value for Example 2
For Example 2 in Section 4.2.4, we need to use our method in Theorem 7 to nd a unique
weighted Shapley value that satises the core conditions and also reects the bargaining powers
of three retailers. That is, given a weight setw, we can nd the corresponding weighted Shapley
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value as
y1 = w1(12) v(12) + w1(13) v(13) + w1(123) [v(123)  v(12)  v(13)  v(23)],
y2 = w2(12) v(12) + w2(23) v(23)  w2(123)[v(123)  v(12)  v(13)  v(23)],
y3 = w3(13) v(13) + w3(23) v(23)  w3(123)[v(123)  v(12)  v(13)  v(23)].
Then, we should solve the following constrained nonlinear problem to nd the weight set
w^.
min
P
i=1;2

wi(12)  i
1 + 2
2
+
P
i=1;3

wi(13)  i
1 + 3
2
+
P
i=2;3

wi(23)  i
2 + 3
2
+ +
P
i=1;2;3

wi(123)  i
1 + 2 + 3
2
subject to
y1  v(1) = 0, y2  v(2) = 0, y3  v(3) = 0;
y1 + y2  v(12), y1 + y3  v(13), y2 + y3  v(23);P
i=1;2wi(12) = 1,
P
i=1;3wi(13) = 1,
P
i=2;3wi(23) = 1,
P
i=1;2;3wi(123) = 1.
The weight set w^ is obtained as
w^1(12) = 0:371, w^2(12) = 0:629; w^1(13) = 0:426, w^3(13) = 0:574;
w^2(23) = 0:556, w^3(23) = 0:444; w^1(123) = 0:256, w^2(123) = 0:413, w^3(123) = 0:331.
We thus nd the weighted Shapley value as
y^1 = w1(12) 1129:96 + w1(13) 646:46  w1(123) 1454:53 = 322:25,
y^2 = w^2(12) 1129:96 + w^2(23) 3317:48  w^2(123) 1454:53 = 1954:54,
y^3 = w^3(13) 646:46 + w^3(23) 3317:48  w^3(123) 1454:53 = 1362:58,
which satises the core conditions and also reects the bargaining powers of three retailers.
8
